

17 March 1960

Draft Letter to General Treitweiser

SUBJECT: Joint Staff Overall Intelligence Estimates for Planning,
Part I, Volume I

1. I have carefully examined the subject Joint Staff paper from the point of view of its consistency with current National Intelligence Estimates. I have noted in an attachment several paragraphs or statements which do not appear entirely consistent with NIE's but which can be made so by relatively simple changes.
2. However, I have a more basic difficulty with this draft. It is, essentially, an effort to present in summary form for military planners the broad range of analysis and argument concerning Soviet courses of action which we have recently treated in NIE 11-4-59. In the process of briefing the discussion, issues have been over-simplified, and much material essential to a balanced and full view of Soviet policy has been omitted. For example, the discussion in Parts IV, V, and VI of the Joint Staff paper does not reflect much of the material in Chapter VI, NIE 11-4-59 which we consider important. There are numerous paragraphs in the Joint Staff paper, which while not altogether inconsistent with National Estimates in themselves, are so simplified that their cumulative impact is quite different from

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that of equivalent passages in CCP 11-4-59. In this regard, I might cite paragraphs 2, 5, 12, 22, 2b, and 26.

3. The net effect of the paper as I read it is to suggest (a) that all Soviet actions are impelled and guided by the objective of "world domination" as an immediate, operable goal; and (b) that the primary means for achieving this objective is, and will be, the use of military force.

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Office of National Estimates

Attachment to General Bratweiner's Letter

SUBJECT: Joint Staff Overall Intelligence Estimate for Planning,
Part I, Volume I

a. Paragraphs 6, last clause of last sentence and Paragraph 7.

It is clear, as stated in paragraphs 121-122 of NIE 11-4-59 that the ability of Communist China and the USSR to conduct identical coordinated policies has been declining. Accordingly, I feel that the referenced JCS text is a bit over-simplified and would suggest deletion of the last clause in paragraph 6 and the substitution of a new paragraph 7 as follows:

"7. The relative solidarity of the Bloc under Soviet influence and control enhances the unity and continuity of its activities, and gives it a certain advantage over the West, whose multiplicity of national policies requires greater negotiated adjustment and compromise. More central control permits greater tactical flexibility and rapid adjustment of Bloc actions to the needs of the moment in any particular field, with less prejudice to long-term policies or strategy. However, the status of Communist China with respect to Soviet influence and control gives it a greater voice in Bloc policy and greater freedom from Soviet control than that accorded other Bloc nations. This will probably constitute an increasingly difficult problem for the unity and continuity of Bloc policies."

b. Paragraph 23, last sentence. The statement that the USSR is striving to attain military superiority over the West which would assure it a clear-cut victory in nuclear war is not consistent with NIE 11-4-59 or NIE 11-4-59.

[REDACTED]

c. Paragraph 26. The meaning of this paragraph is ambiguous and its meaning might be more clear and consistent with National Estimates if the last paragraph read as follows:

"Therefore, unless the URM achieves a technological breakthrough which would permit it to attack the US at no great risk of heavy damage to itself, it will attempt in the years ahead to achieve capabilities which offer the highest degree of deterrence against US attack or at least assure survival in the event of war with the US."

d. Paragraphs 31 e, f, and g. The use of the words "destroy" and "force" tend to suggest military courses of action not consistent with NIE 13-59.

e. Paragraph 52. This is a more clear cut denial of the chances of Chinese Communist military action than is contained in NIE 13-59, paragraph 102.

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Next 4 Page(s) In Document Exempt

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